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Living far away, living less: housing, segregation, and temporal injustice in the contemporary city

  • Feb 11
  • 20 min read

By Carlos Moreno, Scientific Director of the ETI Chair, IAE Paris Sorbonne, Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne University, Member of the French Academy of Technologies, the American Academy of Housing and Communities, and Sigma Xi, the international honor society for scientific research.


1. A multidimensional housing crisis

In 2024, according to estimates by the United Nations Human Settlements Program (UN-Habitat), approximately 1.1 billion people worldwide will be living in precarious housing conditions [1]. This represents about 14% of the world's population. These conditions include housing that is unsanitary, overcrowded, or located in areas without adequate access to drinking water, sanitation, or other essential services. The housing crisis, now much more than a sectoral phenomenon, has become one of the most visible symptoms of contemporary social and territorial disorganization. It is not limited to the volume of available housing or to the issue of urban planning alone. It touches on systemic dynamics: economic, social, land-related, family-related, climate-related—and now also geopolitical, as demonstrated by the migratory movements amplified by conflicts or climate change.


One of the drivers of this crisis is the massive financialization of housing. In many cities around the world, housing is no longer seen as a commodity that meets a basic need, but as a financial asset intended to generate returns. Large real estate companies, tourist rental platforms, and investment funds are transforming entire neighborhoods into areas of speculation, contributing to the scarcity of available housing, skyrocketing rents, and the social desertification of urban centers. In Lisbon[2], Barcelona[3], and Berlin[4], more than 20% of the rental stock is now used for tourism or speculative investment, while long-time residents are being displaced from the city.


This pressure is compounded by another major trend: the decline of the middle class, which has accelerated since the 2008 crisis and been exacerbated by post-COVID inflation. More and more formerly stable households now find themselves in a gray area: too rich to qualify for social housing, too poor to afford market prices. In France, more than 40% of private sector tenants spend more than 30% of their income on rent, and this proportion rises to 50% among young workers [5]. In Germany and across Europe, the phenomenon of the “working poor[6] is becoming more pronounced: a job is no longer a guarantee of decent housing.


Changes in family structures are further increasing the pressure. The rise in single-parent families—mostly headed by women—is increasing the demand for affordable, secure housing close to services and schools. However, this segment of the population is one of the most vulnerable to speculation. The 2023 European Parliament report[7]states that 42.1% of female heads of household with children live in material deprivation or overcrowded housing in Europe. In many countries in the Global South, these families only have access to the informal sector, which is often precarious, unsanitary, and illegal.


The housing crisis therefore no longer affects only the poorest or the forgotten suburbs. It is becoming a social time bomb, affecting young people, the lower middle classes, the elderly, immigrants, precarious workers—in other words, the silent urban majority.


In response to this emergency, political signals are emerging. In 2024, for the first time, the European Commission appointed a Commissioner for Housing, Dan Jørgensen, recognizing the issue on a continental scale. But this position still lacks regulatory power, even though the mayors of 15 European cities — Amsterdam, Athens, Bologna, Budapest, Florence, Ghent, Leipzig, Lisbon, Lyon, Milan, Paris, Warsaw, Zagreb — grouped together in the “Mayors for Housing” initiative[8] are calling for a change of course, with more rent control, land regulation, and guaranteed housing rights [9].

In the Global South, the problem is similar, but aggravated by violent social inequalities, the lack of public housing, and dependence on the informal market. In Nairobi, Lagos, and Lima, between 50 and 70% of the urban population lives in informal or unregulated housing, often without access to essential services[10] [11] [12].


The precariousness of housing is not only a social crisis, but also a health, ecological, and democratic risk. This is why the housing crisis can no longer be considered a secondary or technical issue. Today, it is a test of societies' ability to guarantee citizenship rights and to build fair, livable territories that are capable of coping with the transitions to come.

 

2. Living far away, working elsewhere: disarticulation, segregation, and temporal injustice

The growing disconnect between where people live and where they work is one of the most powerful markers of the contemporary urban crisis. It is the result of an urban model[13] inherited from the 20th century, based on the functional separation of spaces (zoning), individual motorization, suburban sprawl, and the valorization of peripheral land. This model, long supported by public policy, has created a fragmented, hierarchical city, where affordable housing is relegated to the margins, far from jobs, services, and amenities.


Housing is built where land is available, and therefore where land is cheapest: on the outskirts or even in the countryside. In São Paulo[14], Mexico City[15], Johannesburg[16], and many other cities in the global south, social housing programs are often located more than 25 km from economic centers. In Europe, new construction in the suburbs predominates: in the Île-de-France region, more than 60% of new housing between 2000 and 2020 was built in the outer suburbs[17], where there is little connection to employment. These suburbs are becoming dormitory towns, characterized by urban planning that isolates residents: few shops, public transport, or local economic activity.


The direct consequence is massive dependence on cars. In the Lyon region, more than 80% of workers living more than 15 km from the center use their personal vehicles to get to work [18]. In large French cities, low-income households in the suburbs spend up to 25% of their income on transportation alone[19]. This phenomenon of “energy insecurity in mobility[20] [21] [22] adds a financial constraint to geographical isolation and exposes households to fuel price volatility.


This urban layout automatically creates spatial segregation. City centers, where skilled jobs, services, culture, and networks are concentrated, have become inaccessible to the majority of the working class.


At the same time, the suburbs are home to social housing and subsidized home ownership (often in the form of low-quality buildings in poorly served areas), without essential services or local employment opportunities. This “assignment to suburban residence” is the product of a dual mechanism: a deregulated land market on the one hand, and the withdrawal of the state's withdrawal from urban planning on the other.

But this spatial segregation produces an even deeper injustice: a temporal injustice. In the contemporary city, time becomes a marker of class. The poorer you are, the more time you spend traveling to access essential services. A female head of household living in the outer suburbs of Paris and working in the cleaning sector may spend 2 to 3 hours a day commuting between home and work. This represents more than 400 hours per year—or nearly 10 weeks of full-time work devoted to forced, invisible, exhausting mobility [23] [24].


According to data from the Île-de-France Mobility Observatory, the 25% of Île-de-France residents with the lowest incomes spend an average of 1 hour and 50 minutes per day commuting, compared to 1 hour and 10 minutes for the wealthiest[25] . The gap widens further when we take into account travel related to caregiving and accompanying children or relatives, which is mainly the responsibility of women.

Sociologist Hartmut Rosa, in his theory of temporal alienation[26], analyzes this loss of time as a loss of control over one's own life. Time is not just a factor in organization: it is an existential resource. Those who live in poorly served suburbs suffer a double penalty: less free time, fewer opportunities, and less access to the community. Conversely, the upper classes living in urban centers save time, travel on foot or by bicycle, have easy access to urban infrastructure, and are better able to balance their personal and professional lives.


This temporal inequality has become one of the most powerful indicators of contemporary urban fragmentation. And yet, it is rarely incorporated into urban planning policies. Time is invisible in master plans, even though it is experienced intensely by residents.

 

3. A roof is not enough: from home ownership to the illusion of living

The housing crisis is not only the result of a lack of available housing, but also of the way in which housing policies are designed and implemented. In many countries, particularly in the Global South, the state has promoted home ownership as a strategy for social stabilization and the emancipation of the working classes. Buying a home becomes a marker of success, a promise of integration, a vehicle for dignity.

Programs such as “Minha Casa, Minha Vida” in Brazil and “Mi Casa Ya” in Colombia were designed to make home ownership accessible through public subsidies, reduced interest rates, or guaranteed loans. But these policies have shown their structural limitations, often creating more vulnerabilities than they have solved.


First, the homes produced under these programs are often located in remote suburbs, where land is cheap but essential services are lacking: no schools, no healthcare, few accessible jobs, and little public transportation. These homes quickly become “credit traps,” where households are trapped in a daily routine marked by distance, isolation, dependence on cars, and overwhelming logistical costs. This model produces a fragmented, segregated, time-consuming city that reinforces spatial and temporal injustice.


Second, debt becomes a major stress factor. Many families are unable to meet their monthly payments, especially in contexts of unemployment, informality, or economic crisis. The Brazilian example is revealing: The “Minha Casa, Minha Vida” program has delivered more than 4.5 million homes, but numerous case studies and sectoral analyses[27] [28] [29]show that a significant proportion of these units (up to a third in some complexes) have been abandoned, resold, or rented informally due to economic or social difficulties and a lack of urban integration. In Colombia, in December 2024, the Colombian government suspended the Mi Casa Ya program[30] due to a lack of funding, penalizing both households waiting for social housing subsidies and companies in the sector.


This model of peripheral homeownership is also accompanied by a massive transfer of public funds to the private sector. Subsidies are often used to guarantee the profitability of developers rather than to ensure the quality of life of residents. We are witnessing a disguised privatization of housing policy, where the goal is to produce units quickly, rather than to build vibrant and integrated neighborhoods.

At the heart of this approach lies a powerful myth: homeownership equals “success.” But this ownership is sometimes more of a burden than a resource. It freezes mobility, constrains residential choices, limits career changes, and turns modest families into chronic debtors. In reality, these homes are not a territorial anchor, but a form of peripheral house arrest.


It is therefore essential to remember an obvious fact that is too often forgotten: having a roof over your head is not enough to make a home. Housing cannot be reduced to four walls and a notarial deed. Living means having access to a full urban life, services, networks, social ties, and citizenship experienced in space. Far from city centers, without transportation, healthcare, culture, or public spaces, these homes are not houses: they are exile.


This criticism is not limited to the Global South. In Europe, too, unregulated home ownership policies have contributed to pushing young families further and further away from cities, generating increasing car mobility and producing soulless dormitory neighborhoods. The movement back to the city, experiments with third places, affordable leases, housing cooperatives , or the 15-minute city express a reverse aspiration: to live fully, not just to own.


In this sense, the quality of housing cannot be dissociated from its location, its accessibility, and the social environment in which it is situated. Produce housing, yes—but housing that is lived in, rooted, alive, and not simply units of political accounting.

 

4. Diversity, proximity, and temporal justice: rebuilding the everyday city

In the contemporary urban landscape, proximity is emerging as a new strategic horizon for cities in transition. This is not just a slogan for the occasion, but a profound paradigm shift that is shaking up the inherited logic of 20th-century functionalist and motorized urban planning.


While global cities have long been designed according to principles of peripheral expansion, spatial specialization, and car dependency, proximity puts everyday life, human rhythms, and the quality of relationships back at the center of the urban fabric.

This shift is being accelerated by the crises facing urban societies: climate crisis, social crisis, housing crisis, democratic crisis. Added to this is a crisis of time: the time lost in tedious commutes, in forced mobility, in delayed access to healthcare, services, and jobs. It is in this context that the concept of the 15-minute city [31], adopted by many cities around the world, has found immediate resonance. It proposes a model in which every resident could access all essential functions—living, working, eating, healthcare, learning, and relaxation—on foot or by bicycle, within short distances and in a carbon-free manner.


This principle calls into question the very structure of the contemporary city. In Paris, it has inspired Mayor Anne Hidalgo since 2020 to pursue an urban policy focused on transforming schools into open facilities, redeveloping streets into shared public spaces, and reducing the use of private cars as the norm for mobility. In Mexico City, the “UTOPIAS” program is developing accessible services within short distances, particularly in working-class neighborhoods. In Milan, the “Città de 15 minuti” structures the city's entire strategic planning around a network of local living units, and in Melbourne, “20-minute neighborhoods” are integrated into urban planning documents to link housing, local employment, infrastructure, and social ties. Other cities on every continent, of varying sizes and densities, such as Portland, Cleveland, Seoul, Busan, Utrecht, Sousse, Pleszew, and countries such as Scotland, are developing similar programs that integrate specific local characteristics but converge on a common idea: bringing urban functions closer together to reconnect the city with life.


What the city of proximity offers is a functional, social, and temporal reintegration of living spaces. It breaks with the urban planning of large suburban developments, single-function commercial areas, and dormitory neighborhoods produced by decades of cheap land policies. It rejects the model of a city where people live here, work there, consume elsewhere, and receive healthcare even further away. Contrary to this fragmentation, it aims for a polycentric reconcentration through the regeneration of secondary centers, controlled densification, the localization of essential services, and the partial relocation of the economy.


But beyond its functional value, proximity also becomes a vector of spatial justice. For it is precisely the working-class neighborhoods, the relegated areas, urban margins—in short, the most vulnerable places—that today suffer from remoteness, isolation, and poor access to services. A study by Harvard Business School[32] points out that for every additional 10 kilometers of commute, employee productivity decreases, particularly in terms of the quality and quantity of innovations produced. Another study

[33] by Resume.io indicates that remote workers in New York save an average of 331.67 hours per year by eliminating commutes, or about 1 hour and 20 minutes per day over 250 working days. This means more time for children, for training, for participating in local life, and for rest. It also means a reduction in CO₂ emissions, air pollution, and daily stress.

 

Current implementations around the 15-minute city[34] demonstrate that proximity can become a comprehensive and cross-cutting urban regeneration policy. It allows for the intersection of issues such as housing, health, education, mobility, culture, economic inclusion, and citizen participation. It reveals a city of short distances but rich possibilities. It transforms urban space into a local ecosystem of life, rather than a simple logistical platform between housing and employment.

 

But to be truly transformative, the city of proximity must be built on solid foundations: an active land policy, a commitment to social and functional diversity, and shared territorial governance. It cannot succeed without accessible housing, well-distributed public facilities, soft and intermodal mobility, and co-construction with residents. It must also integrate instruments for measuring territorial justice: average average access time to services, number of functions accessible on foot, intersection between spatial precariousness and infrastructure coverage. Proximity cannot be a privilege reserved for certain renovated central neighborhoods. It must become a fundamental urban right, guaranteed to all, in all territories. In this sense, it does not merely improve quality of life: it repairs the urban fabric, corrects historical imbalances, and paves the way for a just transition—social, ecological, and democratic.


5. Proximity and social diversity: levers against urban

segregation Urban segregation is not inevitable: it is a historical, political, and economic construct. It is also a form of injustice that public action can—and must—correct. To this end, social diversity policies, long affirmed as objectives, must now become concrete mechanisms for territorial rebalancing, established over the long term, rigorously implemented, and designed in conjunction with urban regeneration, functional proximity, and spatial justice.


·  Thinking about diversity beyond housing

Social diversity has too often been reduced to an indicator of social housing distribution in urban planning. In France, the SRU law, adopted in 2000, requires a minimum of 20 to 25% social housing in municipalities with more than 3,500 inhabitants. While it has led to progress in some cities, nearly 1,000 municipalities [35] [36] still escape this requirement by paying fines, which are often modest compared to the property tax revenues they preserve. The result is silent resistance to residential redistribution, which perpetuates the exclusivity of affluent neighborhoods.

But diversity cannot be achieved through quotas alone. It requires a systemic vision that includes public services, transportation, economic functions, and everyday amenities. A neighborhood where social and private housing coexist, but without a public school, health center, or local shops, is not truly mixed. Real social diversity is inseparable from functional diversity, which is a prerequisite for equal access to urban resources.


·  More proactive land policies

One of the most effective levers for ensuring diversity remains control of urban land. In Vienna, where more than 60% of the population lives in social or regulated housing[37], the public authorities own a significant proportion of urban land, which ensures the continued production of affordable housing integrated into all neighborhoods. In Switzerland, housing cooperatives benefit from long-term leases, which limit speculation and guarantee rents that are 20 to 40% lower than the private market[38] . In France, the recent creation of solidarity-based real estate companies and mechanisms such as the Bail Réel Solidaire (BRS)[39] opens up a promising avenue: separating land ownership from building ownership in order to remove housing from the speculative market on a long-term basis. The BRS is inspired by the Anglo-Saxon model of Community Land Trusts [40], which aim to offer an alternative to private land ownership and regulate real estate price inflation. However, these tools remain marginal in terms of volume due to a lack of strong political support, territorial engineering, and appropriate large-scale financing.


·  Mobilizing private operators in other ways

The integration of the private sector into diversity policy can no longer rely solely on incentives. In Barcelona, since 2018, the municipality has required that at least 30% of the housing produced in any development of more than 600 m² be allocated to social or affordable housing. In France, publicly-controlled development projects can, through Zones d'Aménagement Concerté (ZACs), require up to 50% of housing to be social housing. These requirements must be made systematic in areas where there is high demand, and extended to functional programming: premises for local shops, nurseries, community centers, and local employment. Local authorities can also use enhanced preemptive rights, not only for specific projects, but to rebuild strategic long-term land reserves capable of accommodating balanced programming.


·  Structural alternatives: cooperatives and non-speculative production

Beyond institutional models, several countries are experimenting with forms of non-speculative and socially rooted urban production, often derived from the social and solidarity economy. The most advanced example is Uruguay, where mutual aid housing cooperatives (CVAM) have enabled the creation of more than 25,000 homes since 1968, built and managed collectively by residents, with technical support from the state and collective control of land [41]. These cooperatives produce lively neighborhoods with shared facilities and social diversity in dense urban areas[42].

Similar initiatives are emerging in Montreal (with non-profit housing organizations)[43], Barcelona [44] (with cohabitats) and Berlin[45] (with self-managed collective housing projects such as Möckernkiez). These initiatives demonstrate that other ways of producing the city are possible, based on cooperation, solidarity,

land use restraint, and territorial anchoring.


·  Reinventing governance

Diversity cannot function without shared territorial governance. Residents must be involved in planning from the outset: choice of facilities, allocation priorities, balance of functions. Tools such as targeted participatory budgets, neighborhood forums, and co-constructed city contracts help to avoid top-down imposition. The experience of Rosario[46] (Argentina), where comprehensive urban projects were defined with local communities, shows that active urban democracy reinforces the legitimacy of diversity policies.


The scale of intervention itself must evolve. It is no longer a question of thinking about diversity at the level of the building or the operation, but at the level of the living environment, in relation to access times, daily mobility, available services, and local economic activity.


·  Towards diversity that guarantees temporal justice

Finally, social diversity is not just a matter of residential diversity: it is a prerequisite for temporal justice. A diverse city is a city where people can live close to their work, access healthcare without having to travel for two hours, send their children to school in their neighborhood, and participate in civic life without depending on a car. It is a city that frees up time for everyone, rather than a city that consumes it unequally. Thinking about social diversity today means thinking about the power to live fully—in space, but also in time. It is a demand for concrete equality, not an abstract principle. It is a development strategy, but also a political project, at the heart of the transition towards fairer, more livable, and more humane cities.


CONCLUSION: Living differently—a manifesto for a close-knit, fair, and sustainable city

Our approach aims to show that the contemporary housing crisis cannot be reduced to a simple supply deficit or a technical planning issue. It reveals a profound mismatch between urban forms, dominant economic models, actual lifestyles, and the fundamental needs of residents. It articulates and crystallizes multiple divisions: economic, social, spatial, temporal, and ecological.


The growing financialization of housing, urban sprawl driven by market forces, the partial failure of homeownership policies in the Global South, the precariousness of the middle classes, the explosion of female-headed single-parent families—all these phenomena converge to weaken living conditions, even in historically better-off countries. Added to this is a crisis in the meaning of the city: it increasingly tends to exclude rather than include, to disperse rather than connect, to accelerate rather than synchronize.


In this context, residential distance is no longer just a spatial constraint: it is becoming a temporal injustice. The time lost in travel, the fatigue of forced mobility, and the invisible cost of kilometers traveled form a new dividing line between residents of city centers and those of the suburbs. Time is becoming a marker of social inequality, a silent indicator of urban decline.


In light of this observation, several strategic directions are emerging. The first is to refocus public action on proximity, not as a nostalgia for the village, but as an operational framework for urban justice.


The 15-minute city, which takes various forms in cities in both the North and South, offers a powerful framework for reconnecting housing, employment, services, culture, health, education, food, and participation. It does not replace planning, but rather redefines it on a daily basis.


But proximity cannot be decreed: it must be built, financed, and governed. It requires bold land policies, active mobilization of the public sector, and a redefinition of urban value based on use rather than rent. It also requires a transformation of the frameworks for action: moving from technical efficiency to quality of life, from segmentation of skills to cross-functionality, from a stock-based approach to an access-based approach.


Social and functional diversity is the second pillar of this transformation. It can no longer be an adjustment variable in urban planning documents: it must become a structuring objective, accompanied by resources, regulations, and citizen counter-powers. It requires rethinking land use, local taxation, and forms of housing production—integrating cooperative models, solidarity leases, public land, and new forms of anchored collective housing.


More broadly, it is a question of restoring political centrality to the act of living. Living is not just about housing: it is about being able to anchor one's life in a territory, forge links, exercise rights, and participate in community life. This vision requires a new urban culture that articulates time, uses, vulnerabilities, and belonging. A culture that rejects the logic of eviction, assignment, or over-mobilization.


In a world facing major ecological transitions, recurring social crises, and a growing demand for local democracy, the way we inhabit the city is becoming a matter of survival as much as civilization. Territories can no longer be thought of as mere technical supports or reservoirs of housing. They must become the matrix for a fair, resilient, and fully inhabited urban life.


It is on this condition that urban policies will once again become policies for the future—capable not only of providing housing, but also of bringing people together, repairing, and emancipating.

 

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[39] Ministry of Housing, Solidarity-based land organizations and solidarity-based real leases, May 2024, https://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/documents/Les%20organismes%20de%20foncier%20solidaire%20et%20le%20bail%20reel%20solidaire%202024.pdf

[40] Davis, John Emmeus, The Community Land Trust Reader. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2010

[41] Chilowicz, Juliette, Mutual Aid Housing Cooperatives – Uruguay, 2018, Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne University, https://cfuhabitat.hypotheses.org/files/2019/11/Memoire_Juliette_Chilowicz.pdf

[42] For more information on CVAM/FUCVAM (Uruguayan Federation of Mutual Aid Housing Cooperatives) in Uruguay, see the next article in this issue #118 of the AdP Bulletin: The city by and for its inhabitants. Land management, self-build, solidarity financing by Pierre Arnold – Project Manager, urbaMonde – France

[43] Fédération des OSBL d’habitation de Montréal (FOHM). (n.d.). Répertoire des OSBL d’habitationhttps://fohm.org/osblh-definition/repertoire-osbl-habitation/

[44] Miralles Buil, Diego, The reterritorialization of the housing sector in Barcelona and Madrid: towards a new urban governance of housing? Sud-Ouest européen, 2018 (46), 23-38.

[45] Building Social Ecology. (n.d.). Möckernkiez: offers cooperative living units in the city centerhttps://www.buildingsocialecology.org/projects/mockernkiez-berlin/

[46] Participedia, Participatory Budgeting in Rosario, Argentinahttps://participedia.net/case/1115


This English translation was prepared with the assistance of DeepL, a language model developed by OpenAI, based on the original French article published in May 2025 on the AdP – Villes en Développement bulletin website.


 
 
 

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